“Ways Things Can’t Be,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38 (1997) 583–596 (published in 1998).
I show that the believer in possible worlds can have impossible worlds for free, as classes of possible worlds. These do exactly the job of ways that things cannot be, and they model the simple paraconsistent logic LP. This motivates a semantics for paraconsistent logic that even a classical logician can love.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my website. I work in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Email: greg at consequently.org; Post: School of of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia.
Start at the home page—a summary of the site. The left column is news, archived on the news archive page. The central column is for photos, archived on the occasional photos page. The right column contains recent items from the writing page, which lists my publications. These are also categorised by topic. You can follow my links at my account on delicious and occasional short snarky remarks at @consequently on twitter.
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of everything, the feed of news items only , or the feed of writing items only , which is also great for podcasting pdfs automatically.
This site is handcoded: I write text in Textmate, and Webby files things in the right place and uploads them to the server. This page was last modified on 2008-12-31 at 10:33PM.
The aim of philosophy is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.
— Wilfrid Sellars “Philosophy and the Scientfic Image of Man”.
