This is Greg Restall’s website, with news, writings, links, and bite sized updates. For background look below.
“Constructive Logic, Truth and Warranted Assertibility,” Philosophical Quarterly, 51 (2001) 474–483.
Shapiro and Taschek have argued that simply using intuitionistic logic and its Heyting semantics, one can show that there are no gaps in warranted assertibility. That is, given that a discourse is faithfully modelled using Heyting”s semantics for the logical constants, that if a statement S is not warrantedly assertible, then its negation ~S is. Tennant has argued for this conclusion on similar grounds. I show that these arguments fail, albeit in illuminating ways. I will show that an appeal to constructive logic does not commit one to this strong epistemological thesis, but that appeals to semantics of intuitionistic logic nonetheless do give us certain conclusions about the connections between warranted assertibility and truth.
I’m Greg Restall, and this is my website. I work in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Email: greg at consequently.org; Post: School of of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia.
Start at the home page—a summary of the site. The left column is news, archived on the news archive page. The central column contains recent items from the writing page, which lists my publications. These are also categorised by topic. You can follow my links at my account on delicious and occasional short snarky remarks at @consequently on twitter.
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This site is handcoded: I write text in Textmate, and Webby files things in the right place and uploads them to the server. This page was last modified on 2009-01-01 at 05:29PM.
When I started writing this book, I intended to explain in the preface that this was the history of epistemology since Kant, the way Carnap would have written it had he been Hegel.
— Alberto Coffa’s preface to The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap.