(with Daniel Nolan and Caroline West) “Moral Fictionalism versus the rest,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83 (2005), 307–330.
In this paper we introduce a distinct meta-ethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the “moral phenomena” while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distiguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism many all of the virtues of quasi-realism but few of the vices.
Author: Greg Restall
Status: Published in 2005
Local file: mf.pdf
(395KB)
DOI: 10.1080/00048400500191917
Subjects:
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Q: How many speech act theorists does it take to change a light bulb? / A: Do you really want to know or are you simply asking me to change it?